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EXPLAINING COOPERATION IN MUNICIPAL SOLID 
WASTE MANAGEMENT 
Kelly H. Tiller and Paul M. J akus 
ABSTRACT 
As traditional methods of municipal solid waste management (MSWM) become 
increasingly expensive due to increased regulation, many local governments are considering 
cooperation as a waste management strategy. A theoretical model is used to specify a partial 
observability probability model in which the decision Tennessee counties made to form either a 
single-county solid waste region or a multi-county region. We find that, while economies of 
scale may be a factor in the consolidation decision, current and future levels of solid waste 
services are statistically more important. 
Key words: regional cooperation, municipal solid waste; waste management,; regionalization 
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EXPLAINING COOPERATION IN MUNICIPAL SOLID 
WASTE MANAGEMENT1 
INTRODUCTION 
Municipal solid waste (MSW) refers to a specific portion of the generated waste stream, 
primarily solid waste generated by residential, commercial, institutional, and some industrial 
sources. Traditionally, municipal solid waste management (MSWM) has been the responsibility 
of local governments, with landfilling the most common method of disposal. In the early 1990's 
federal regulations affecting traditional methods of solid waste disposal increased the cost by as 
much as five- to ten-fold. In addition, the vast majority of states passed recycling laws, or 
adopted recycling, diversion, or waste reduction goals, and many states approved comprehensive 
waste management legislation requiring long-term planning (Steuteville, 1995). As MSWM has 
grown increasingly complex and expensive, one strategy that some communities have developed 
to meet new MSWM challenges is regional (e.g., multi-county, multi-community) cooperation. 
Cooperation is a process whereby neighboring cities, counties, or other governmental entities 
pool resources to address local challenges, taking advantage of the potential economies of scale 
associated with many aspects of MSWM. Many states have also included incentives, provisions, 
and/or mandates for formation of solid waste regions as an element ofMSWM legislation. 
Beyond the narrow arena of solid waste management, rural regions are faced with ever 
tightening budgetary environments and must investigate alternative means to supply necessary or 
mandated public goods. A common method is to exploit economies of scale by merging or 
consolidating service regions for public goods. Following Gyimah-Brempong's (1987) 
lWe thank David Brasington for helpful comments on forming the data set. Responsibility for errors 
remains with the authors. 
2 
pioneering empirical work on consolidation of law enforcement agencies, many researchers have 
applied a translog cost function approach to evaluating scale efficiencies in the consolidation of 
rural school districts (see, among many studies, the recent analysis of rural Arkansas school 
districts by Dodson and Garrett, 2003). Other applications to provision of public goods in rural 
regions include studies of county-level extension services by Garrett (2001) and rural roads by 
Deller and Nelson (1991).2 Despite its obvious appeal, the cost function approach often presents 
empirical difficulties in that one must have explicit measures for both inputs and outputs for 
public goods. Inputs and outputs may not easily be quantified, however, and a quick review of 
the literature will reveal some degree of anguish on the part of researchers with respect to this 
issue (e.g., Garrett, p. 816). Even if one has reasonably good measures for inputs and outputs, 
one must often assume away difficulties associated withjointness in production of outputs. 
Further, it is not just scale economies that matter in the consolidation decision. A local 
government may enjoy scale economies of a merger in the provision of a public good yet choose 
not to take advantage of economies because the joint level of provision is not an optimum for the 
entity. For example, Jacques et al. (2000) show that rural Oklahoma schools can achieve the 
scale economies with larger school districts. The authors also show that student achievement 
declines as districts get larger. Given this tradeoff, a community may rationally reject a cost-
saving merger if the jointly provided public good (student quality) is unsatisfactory. 
Our empirical analysis concerns county-level cooperation decisions made in the aftermath 
of the 1991 Tennessee Solid Waste Management Act. The theoretical approach follows Miceli's 
(1993) model as developed to address public school district consolidation. Miceli's model 
2Rather than the "standard" cost function approach used by many, Deller and Nelson used a Farrell frontier 
model to evaluate efficiencies associated with consolidation. 
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allowed for mergers only if both scale economies and the joint level of public goods provision 
represented a Pareto improvement for all. Similar to DeBoer (1995), we use the Miceli model to 
evaluate consolidation of solid waste management districts, but our analysis differs from DeBoer 
in that we use Poirer's (1980) partial observability approach for model estimation. This model 
recognizes the decision to merge districts is a jointly determined outcome that is the result of 
independent decisions of individual districts, an important factor not addressed in DeBoer's 
study. The partial observability approach offers advantages over the cost function approach 
because it is well-grounded in economic theory yet is far less data intensive. 
We first review Miceli's theoretical model explaining the joint provision of a public 
good, where the model is used to specify the factors important to an empirical test. The partial 
observability model is then reviewed, followed by a presentation of the empirical results. We 
then conclude with an agenda of future research. 
Economies of Scale in a Model of Regional Cooperation 
The argument that cooperation, or consolidation, in the provision of public goods was 
explicitly expressed in Miceli's (1993) version of the Tiebout model. The model recognizes that 
public goods, such as the provision of solid waste services, are funded out of property tax 
revenues. Following Miceli's notation, a budget constraint for a member of county i can be 
written as, 
yi = Xi + p(l + ti)hi 
where Yi is income, Xi is a numeraire, p is the price of housing, ti is the property tax rate, and hi is 
the quantity of housing. Given this income constraint, one can optimize utility and specify an 
indirect utility function, 
4 
where gi is the level of public goods provided by the local government. According to the 
Tiebout hypothesis, 'members of a county will choose a residence so as to maximize this utility 
function on the basis of the cost and provision of public goods. The county's tax base is given 
by, 
with Hi being the total housing stock in county i and Si being the value of non-residential taxable 
property in the county. 
Assume that MSWM is the sole public good provided by the county. Let c(nJ denote the 
unit cost function for providing MSWM to the ni residents of the county. As the derivative of the 
unit cost function is negative or positive, marginal costs are decreasing or increasing. 3 
Economies of scale exist if the marginal cost, dc/dni,is less than average unit cost, c(nJlni. 
Diseconomies occur if dc/dni > c(nJlni. A balanced budget for the county is then given by4, 
Dividing both sides by ni and re-arranging yields, 
c(m) 
- - Xgi 
(1) ti = --=..cn;...:....i --
Bdni 
Equation (1) shows the supply of the public good in t-g space, where the slope of the supply 
function is defined by the per capita unit cost of provision (in the numerator) and the per capita 
tax base (denominator). 
3If dc/dn=O then there are no scale economies, and c(nJ=c(nj+ 1). 
4If exogenous planning and operating funds for a MSWM district are given by Gj , total revenue available 
for solid waste management is given by tjB j + Gj • Because planning funds were provided on only a one-time basis 
they are ignored in this analysis. 
Assume now that a multi-county MSWM region is proposed. Such a regional 
administration provides solid waste services gR which may differ from gi. Assume further that 
administrative costs are shared in proportion to county population. Total costs to county i are 
now given by (n/n)[ c(n)gR] , where n is the regional population. The balanced budget supply of 
solid waste services under regionalization, t/, is given by, 
(2) 
c(n) 
-- XgR 
t~ =_n __ _ 
I Bilm 
The average unit cost of solid waste services, c(n)/n, will fall if there are unexploited economies 
of scale associated with regionalization. If scale economies exist, the same level of solid waste 
services may be provided at a lower cost, yielding a lower tax rate for the community. 
5 
Miceli also notes (p. 351) that two counties may be currently be providing different levels 
of service, say gi and gj, and the jointly feasible level of provision, gR, may differ from the initial 
amount offered by either community. Even if scale economies exist, each community must 
decide if the change in the level of provision is worth the change in the community tax rate. This 
suggests that, in addition to economies of scale measures, current levels and future levels of solid 
waste services will be considered by entities. Finally, Brasington's (1999) study of school 
district consolidation in Ohio notes that, given the relationships in (1) and (2), " ... communities 
rich in property value will not be inclined to merge with property-poor communities unless they 
are sufficiently compensated by cost savings" (p. 378).5 
Municipal Solid Waste Management in Tennessee 
Tennessee passed a comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act in 1991. Passage of 
this Act was the first effort by the state to require all counties to meet a minimum standard level 
5See also Brasington, 2003. 
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of service in the area of solid waste management. Elements of the legislation addressed solid 
waste planning, collection, disposal, recycling, education, and funding as well as collection and 
disposal of problem wastes. 
Specifically, the legislation required each county to form a solid waste region and to 
develop a ten-year solid waste plan for the region. The legislation included a number of required 
elements, including the requirement that at least 90% of all residents in the region have collection 
service available to them.6 The minimum collection service level was established to be a system 
of drop-off convenience centers for garbage collection. Additionally, each county had to 
establish a minimum of one collection center for recyclable materials. Grants were provided for 
planning purposes, but not for ongoing operational costs. 
Counties were permitted to form multi-county solid waste regions or a single-county 
region. According to Section 12.a.2 of the Act, "The preferred organization of the regions shall 
be multi-county. Any county adopting a resolution establishing a single-county region shall state 
the reasons for acting alone in the resolution." No upper limits were placed on region size, 
provided that all region members were contiguous counties. 
Analysis conducted in 1991 by the University of Tennessee Waste Management Research 
and Education Institute (Barkenbus, et al.) indicates that potential scale economies exist in 
Tennessee (Figure 1). Savings are primarily due to declining average costs of landfilling in a 
sub-title D-compliant landfill up to an efficient tonnage level. Economies of scale at landfills are 
based 1) tonnage per day received at the facilities, 2) compaction rates achieved, as measured by 
in-place refuse densities, 3) percentage of landfill volume taken up by dirt required for various 
6 Another requirement was that all counties were to reduce the amount of MSW entering landfills or 
incinerators by 25% over a 4 year period. 
cover operations, and 4) average height of refuse over the liner (CTAS, 1991). The cost savings 
available to larger facilities are due to the fact that more waste can be handled with relatively 
small increases in equipment and labor, and there is an inverse relationship between the tonnage 
received per day and percentage dirt required for cover. Further scale economies may be 
captured at the collection stage as well as disposal. 
In response to the 1991 Tennessee Solid Waste Management Act, some 45 of 
Tennessee's 95 counties joined multi-county solid waste regions in 1993. In addition to the 50 
one-county regions, one two-county, seven three-county, three four-county, and one ten-county 
regions were formed (Figure 2). The decision each county made regarding the formation of a 
solid waste region provides a natural experiment to test the Miceli model. 
METHODS AND DATA 
Econometric Methods. The theoretical model suggests that the major factors affecting the 
cooperation decision are per capita property values, population, current levels of service, future 
levels of service, and differences in these measures. Unfortunately, we cannot directly measure 
the "desire" of a county to join a region. This is because the observed outcome-joining a multi-
county region or not-is the result of an agreement between two entities, not one. Thus, the 
appropriate method of modeling the outcome is a "partial observability" model (Poirier, 1980). 
Consider the desire by county 1 to join county 2 as measured by the latent variable YI *, 
and parameterized according to YI * = !(XI; (3), where the vector of explanatory variables Xl is 
given by the theoretical model. The desire of county 2 to join county 1 is measured by the latent 
variable Y2 * and parameterized by Y2 * = g(X2; (3). Following the standard random utility model 
7 
8 
hypothesis, we observe county 1 desiring to join county 2, denoted as Yl = 1, ifYl * >0.7 IfYl * < 0, 
then the county does not wish to join andYl = 0. Similarly, county 2 will desire to form a 
regional partnership with county 1, denoted as Y2 = 1, if Y2 * >0, with Y2 = ° otherwise. The 
analyst does not observe either the latent variables Yl * or Y2 *. Given the fact that both entities 
must agree to form a partnership, Y land Y2 are not observed either. Instead, what is observed is 
the joint outcome, Z = Yl x Y2. The observed joint outcome, z, will take the value of one (an 
agreement) if and only ifYl= Y2=i. If either county chooses not to cooperate, Z = 0. Poirier 
terms this a partial observability model, which can be modeled as a bivariate probit with the 
likelihood function, 
where <1>2(-) is the bivariate normal distribution and p is the correlation between the two entities' 
choices. 
Data. County level data were available from a variety of sources. MSWM regional status data 
were provided by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Solid 
Waste Assistance. The same department also provided information on the current state of solid 
waste collection in each county, including the presences of landfills and the percentage of 
unmanaged waste in a county. Population density and population growth rates were gathered 
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, while property tax base data were found in the Tennessee 
Statistical Abstract. Means for the single-county and multi-county regions are shown in Table 1. 
Following Brasington's data arrangement method, the 95 counties in Tennessee had 367 
7 The random utility model asserts that county one will desire to cooperate with county 2 if the utility of the 
regional partnership exceeds the utility of the single county MSWM "region", or r/(t/, gRJ > Ui (ti , gl) . 
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potential cooperative regional partnerships in the provision of solid waste services.8 For any 
given county, a potential partner may consist of one or more counties as long as the first county is 
contiguous with the potential partner. The data are arranged randomly in that assigning a 
particular county or group of counties to "position" one or "position" two in the data set did not 
intentionally follow any pattern. Further, given that potential partners may consist of more than 
one county, we now refer to potential partners as "entities" or "units." 
An entity's per capita assessed valuation measures the denominator in equation (2), while 
the population of the entity proxies for average unit cost of solid waste services (the numerator). 
Following Brasington, we anticipate that differences in assessed property valuation cause entities 
to be less likely to form a solid waste region. Economies of scale are measured using two 
different variables. The first method follows Callan and Thomas (2001) and uses population 
density as a proxy for scale economies, whereas the second method follows Brasington (1999) 
and uses population as a proxy. The economies of scale hypothesis is supported with a negative 
coefficient on the linear population density (population) term and a positive sign on the square 
root of population density (population) term.9 It is not clear that differences in population density 
(population) across entities would be positively or negatively related to scale economies. 
Current levels of solid waste services (gD are measured in two ways. First, the presence 
of a subtitle-D compliant landfill operated by the county or contractually available to the county 
is measure of current services. Secondly, the Tennessee legislation mandates that 90% of a 
region's residents must have access to some form of solid waste collection, a minimum level of 
8See Brasington's Appendix A, p.391. Prior to conducting any econometric analysis, Dr. Brasington was 
gracious enough to review our data arrangement. 
9We depart from the standard "squared" non-linear term to avoid scaling issues in the maximum likelihood 
estimation. The negative sign on the linear term and a positive sign on the square root non-linear term will yield the 
familiar inverted-U shape for a function. 
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recycling opportunity and a 10-year assurance of disposal capacity. In essence, the legislation 
mandates a minimum level of gR. Some counties satisfied all of these requirements prior to the 
legislation passage (gi ~gR) whereas other counties did not satisfy any (gi < gR). We capture this 
legislative influence with a variable measuring the percentage of unmanaged waste in a county at 
the time the legislation was passed. Counties with higher percentages of unmanaged waste have 
"further" to go to meet state-mandated service level requirements. It is hypothesized that the 
more effort required on the part of a county to meet state-mandated requirements, the more likely 
it be to join a multi-county solid waste region to achieve (gR). That is, the net marginal benefits 
of cooperation are likely to be higher for counties with infant solid waste management programs 
than those with well-developed programs. The difference in the percentage of unmanaged waste 
represents a difference in the level of current service offered by each entity, gi - gj. It is 
hypothesized that the greater the difference in current service levels reduces the likelihood of 
cooperation. 
Econometric Results 
Three econometric specifications were tested (Table 2). The first specification focuses 
only on those variables that capture the economies of scale hypothesis, current provision of solid 
waste services, and a measure of the specific aspects of the legislation providing the impetus for 
consolidation. In Model #1 of Table 2, the linear population density tenn is statistically 
insignificant, with ofP-value of 0.17, whereas the non-linear tenn is significant. These results 
do not clearly support scale economies hypothesis in the decision to fonn a solid waste region. 
In contrast, the difference in per capita assessed valuation is statistically significant. This 
suggests that the greater the relative disparity in county wealth the less likely the entities are to 
fonn a solid waste region. Access to a subtitle-D landfill also makes the entity less likely to fonn 
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multi-county region. We interpret this result as finding that entities that satisfy the one of the 
minimum legislative requirements (i.e., those for which gi ";::gR prior to the legislation) are less 
likely to find formation of a multi-county solid waste region an improvement. Finally, as the 
percentage of unmanaged waste in a county increases the greater the likelihood of a regional 
partnership. This tendency is tempered by the negative effect of the difference on unmanaged 
waste: partnerships are made between those with similar unmanaged waste problems. The 
correlation coefficient, Rho, is statistically significant, indicating the decisions of the two entities 
is "connected" and that the bivariate approach correctly accounts for this dependence across 
entities. This specification did an excellent job of predicting those counties that would join a 
multi-county solid waste region, but predicted rather poorly those that would not join a region 
(less than 10% correctly predicted). 
To improve the predictive capability of the model, we consider another potentially 
important aspect of the legislation: the 10-year assurance of disposal. This suggests that a 
measure of future growth in solid waste generation be reflected in the model. The second 
specification reflects this aspect by adding the popUlation growth rate to the model (Model #2). 
In this case, the population density terms are both statistically significant if one chooses a P-value 
of 0.11. Larger differences across entities in per capita assessed valuation make cooperation in 
solid waste management less likely. The presence of a subtitle-D landfill also reduces the 
probability of a cooperative arrangement. Increasing amounts of unmanaged waste lead to 
cooperation but, again, only among those entities sharing similar level of unmanaged waste. 
Finally, because those units with higher population growth rates will be generating an ever 
greater quantity of solid waste; high growth rates reduce the probability that an entity will join a 
multi-county solid waste region. This model maintains the excellent prediction record of Model 
12 
#1 for those choosing to join a region (almost 80% correctly predicted), while greatly improving 
the predictive record for those not choosing to join (with 32% correctly predicted). 
Finally. Model #3 replaces the Population Density terms with measures of Population (the 
measure used by Brasington and others). Similar to Models #1 and #2, this specification 
provides relatively weak support for the economies of scale hypothesis. The linear popUlation 
term is statistically insignificant at conventional levels, whereas the non-linear term is significant 
at the 10% level. All other variables retain similar signs and levels of significance as the two 
initial specifications. This model did the best job at correctly predicting the outcome of the 
decision process, with an overall success rate of 56.4%. 
Conclusions 
The partial observability approach to modeling consolidation decisions has proved to be a 
useful and relatively simple analytical method that may prove of interest to other researchers. 
Similar to the cost function framework, the partial observability model can be well-grounded in 
economic theory yet avoid many of the data complications of the former. The Miceli theoretical 
model of consolidation provides a clear set of testable hypotheses and can be readily 
implemented in the empirical framework offered by the partial observability approach. 
With respect to our empirical application, we find some support for economies of scale in 
the formation of solid waste regions in Tennessee, but the evidence is not overwhelming. While 
the coefficients indicate that scale economies are likely to be present, only one of these 
coefficients was consistently significant across specifications. Instead, the statistically strongest 
factors in the empirical model proved to be related to current and future levels of solid waste 
services. Access to a subtitle D-compliant landfill and low levels of unmanaged waste for an 
entity made that entity less likely to join a multi-county solid waste region relative to those 
13 
without access to a landfill and with high levels of unmanaged waste. Further, those entities with 
high future growth in solid waste generation were less likely to join in multi-county regions. 
Taken collectively, the statistical results highlight Miceli's point that the existence of scale 
economies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a merger between two entities. Indeed, 
our results suggest that the joint provision level and differences in current individual provision 
levels are the driving forces in the decision of Tennessee counties to join a multi-county solid 
waste region. 
While the results presented in this paper are satisfying, the statistical models do not 
include other important factors that are difficult to measure. For example, Author (1996) argues 
that political risk and loss of local autonomy are important contributors to the cooperation 
decision. Dinar and Wolf (1997) echo this argument, finding that political considerations are the 
stabilizing influence in regional solutions that are economically feasible. Future research on 
cooperative outcomes should endeavor to incorporate these factors into the analysis. 
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Figure 2: Solid Waste Management Regions in Tenneessee 
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Table 1. Variable means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values. 
Variable 
Population Density 
(Persons/Sq. Mi.) 
45 "Join" Counties 
50 ''Not Join" Counties 
Per Capita Assessed Value 
($1000) 
45 "Join" Counties 
50 "Not Join" Counties 
Subtitle-D Landfill 
(O=No Access, 1=Access) 
45 "Join" Counties 
50 "Not Join" Counties 
Mean 
79.25 
126.69 
6.68 
7.35 
0.31 
0.54 
Standard 
Deviation 
82.58 
207.50 
1.49 
2.66 
0.47 
0.50 
Minimum 
18.94 
15.63 
4.89 
4.43 
o 
o 
Maximum 
495.93 
1,054.41 
11.06 
16.76 
1 
1 
..................................................................................... .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... -
% of Waste Unmanaged 
45 "Join" Counties 35.9 
50 "Not Join" Counties 26.4 
...................................................................... . ............................................................................................................................................. _ ...... . 
% Population Growth Rate 
45 "Join" Counties 
50 "Not Join" Counties 
2.73 
5.94 
22.5 
24.8 
8.27 
8.88 
o 
o 
-10.50 
-5.70 
77.1 
78.0 
41.10 
39.40 
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Table 2. Partial Observability Models of Regional Cooperation 
Variable Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 
Beta t-stat Beta t-stat Beta t-stat 
Intercept -2.749 -0.530 -3.454 -0.622 -2.334 -0.418 
Population Density -0.373 -1.388 -0.551 -1.612 
Sqr. Root Pop. Dens. 1.171 b 1.733 1.676a 2.015 
Population -0.479 -1.495 
Sqr. Rt. Population 0.455b 1.727 
Difference in 0.053 0.271 0.105 0.560 Population Density 
Difference in 0.004 0.227 Population 
Per Capita Assessed 
-0.208 -0.281 -0.132 -0.167 -0.047 -0.059 Valuation 
Sqr. Root PC 1.441 0.364 1.455 0.345 -0.884 0.212 Assessed Valuation 
Difference in PC 
-0.357 a 
-2.691 -0.442 a -3.355 -0.412a -2.940 Assessed Valuation 
Sub-D Landfill -0.355 a -2.209 -0.400 a -2.624 -0.425a -1.980 
% of Waste 1.276 a 3.941 1.299 a 3.744 1.453a 2.341 Unmanaged 
Difference in % of 
-3.696 a 
-5.408 -3.893a -5.81 -3.838a -5.286 Waste Unmanaged 
Population Growth 
-0.022 a 
-2.842 -0.024a -2.129 Rate 
Difference in 
Population Growth -0.003 -0.953 -0.005 -1.129 
Rate 
Rho -0.989a -8.075 -0.997a -8.982 -0.875b -1.74 
Lo g-Likelihood -178.851 -172.991 -177.000 
Chi-Square 57.77 a 69.496 a 61.488a 
% Correct 32.4% 44.4% 56.4% 
% "Not Join" Correct 9.9% 32.5% 60.2% 
% "Join" Correct 98 .9% 79.6% 45.2% 
a=significant at the 5% level, two-sided test. 
b=significant at the 10% level, two-sided test. 
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